Covenant-Lite Is the Norm: What Lenders Can Still Underwrite

Key takeaways
- Covenant prevalence: Approximately 90% of private credit loans are "covenant-lite," which removes many traditional warning signs (gfmag.com).
- Credit standards: Jamie Dimon has noted that credit standards have been modestly weakening across the board, specifically regarding aggressive performance assumptions and increased PIK use (gfmag.com).
- Default risk: While the adjusted default rate in private credit is near 5%, companies with US$100 million of EBITDA or more show a covenant default rate of 1.4% (catenaa.com) (blackrock.com).
- Yield premium: Direct lending offers more than 200 basis points of excess spread return relative to new-issue single-B broadly syndicated loans (blackrock.com).
CR3 Partners has stated that approximately 90% of private credit loans are "covenant-lite" (gfmag.com). This structural shift fundamentally alters how credit risk is managed in the private markets. In a traditional loan agreement, maintenance covenants require the borrower to meet specific financial ratios (such as debt-to-EBITDA or interest coverage) at regular intervals. A breach of these covenants allows a lender to intervene before a payment default occurs. In a covenant-lite environment, these periodic tests are removed, leaving lenders to rely on "incurrence-only" covenants, which are only triggered if the borrower takes a specific action like issuing more debt or making an acquisition.
The erosion of the early warning system
The move toward covenant-lite structures creates a significant information gap for lenders. When a borrower is required to maintain a certain leverage ratio every quarter, the lender receives a regular, standardized signal of financial health. If the ratio deteriorates, the lender can negotiate a restructuring or demand more collateral while the company is still a going concern. Under covenant-lite terms, the lender often remains a passive observer until a hard default on principal or interest payments occurs. This delay can significantly reduce the recovery value of the collateral because the borrower has had more time to deplete its cash reserves.
Jamie Dimon has identified several issues contributing to this trend, including more aggressive assumptions about future performance, weaker covenants, and more frequent use of payment-in-kind (PIK) interest (gfmag.com). PIK interest is a form of interest that is not paid in cash but is instead added to the principal balance of the loan. While this preserves cash flow for the borrower in the short term, it increases the total debt burden over time, creating a "compounding" effect that can lead to a sudden spike in leverage.
The absence of maintenance covenants shifts the burden of monitoring from the lender's legal rights to the lender's ability to analyze real-time financial data.
Why It Matters
Analyzing the credit view: What remains underwriteable?
A credit committee does not stop underwriting just because maintenance covenants are absent. Instead, the focus shifts from "compliance" to "capacity." When evaluating a loan in a covenant-lite environment, the credit view moves through five distinct gates. We evaluate these via a structured hierarchy of risk.
- Cash Flow: We look past the "pro forma" EBITDA. If the borrower is using aggressive adjustments or high levels of PIK interest, the cash flow is considered low quality. We ask: "What is the cash flow after all mandatory debt service, including the capitalized interest component?"
- Collateral: In the absence of covenants, the strength of the asset base is paramount. We analyze the liquidation value of the inventory, receivables, and intellectual property. We ask: "If we have to take the assets today, what is the recovery after liquidation costs?"
- Covenants: Even if maintenance covenants are gone, we look for "negative covenants" (restrictions on actions) and "incurrence covenants." We ask: "Can the borrower strip the company of value through dividends or asset sales before we can act?"
- Structure: We examine the seniority and the "waterfall" of payments. We look at the presence of any financial covenants that might still exist in the intercreditor agreement. We ask: "Where do we sit in the capital stack if a restructuring is forced?"
- Sponsor/Management: We assess the "skin in the game." We look at the equity cushion provided by the private equity sponsor. We ask: "How much equity is at risk before our debt is impaired?"
The sector concentration and risk profile
Risk is not distributed evenly across the private credit universe. Sector allocation plays a significant role in the underlying credit quality of a portfolio. For example, Morgan Stanley estimates that software allocation in direct lending is roughly 26% (catenaa.com). This is significantly higher than the exposure seen in other diversified funds. Apollo’s Debt Solutions BDC, for instance, has over 12% of its holdings in software (catenaa.com). Software companies often have high gross margins but can experience rapid shifts in valuation and cash flow based on subscription retention rates. Lenders in this space must focus heavily on the quality of recurring revenue and the "burn rate" of cash.
| Metric/Entity | Value/Statistic | Source/Context |
|---|---|---|
| Private Credit Covenant-Lite Share | ~90% | CR3 Partners (gfmag.com) |
| Software Allocation (Morgan Stanley) | ~26% | Direct Lending (catenaa.com) |
| Software Allocation (Apollo Debt Solutions BDC) | >12% | Holdings (catenaa.com) |
| Adjusted Default Rate (Private Credit) | ~5% | Industry Estimate (catenaa.com) |
| Covenant Default Rate (>$100m EBITDA) | 1.4% | BlackRock (blackrock.com) |
The data suggests a divergence in risk. While the broad adjusted default rate in private credit is near 5% (blackrock.com), companies with US$100 million of EBITDA or more show a much lower covenant default rate of 1.4% (blackrock.com). This implies that the "size" of the borrower is a significant factor in the ability to navigate the lack of maintenance covenants. Larger companies often have more sophisticated treasury functions and more diverse revenue streams, which provides a buffer that smaller, more levered companies lack.
The counter-reading: Is the spread enough?
One reading is that the current market structure is a trap: lenders are accepting higher risk (covenant-lite, PIK interest, aggressive assumptions) for a spread that may not adequately compensate for the loss of early warning signals. The argument is that if a default occurs, the lack of covenants means the lender is "too late" to protect the principal, and the recovery rate will be lower than historical norms.
The counter-reading is that the "excess spread" provides a sufficient cushion. Direct lending offers more than 200 basis points of excess spread return relative to new-issue single-B broadly syndicated loans (blackrock.com). For a lender, this spread is intended to cover the higher probability of loss and the increased cost of monitoring. From this perspective, the credit risk is not "unmanageable," it is simply "priced." The lender is trading the legal protection of a covenant for a higher yield and a more direct relationship with the borrower, which can provide better qualitative information than a quarterly ratio report.
Analysis: Scenario Comparison
To understand the impact of these shifts, we compare two hypothetical credit scenarios. Note that these numbers are hypothetical and round.
- The loan is covenant-lite. The lender has no right to intervene because no maintenance covenant was breached. The company uses its remaining cash to fund operations for six months. By the time the lender realizes the situation, the company has reached a hard default, and the enterprise value has declined significantly due to the prolonged distress.
The practical implication is that in Scenario B, the lender's role is purely reactive. In Scenario A, the lender's role is proactive. The credit committee must decide if the 200+ bps of excess spread is sufficient to cover the "proactive vs. reactive" gap.
Illustrative example
The following numbers are hypothetical and round. Consider a mid-market software company with $100 million in EBITDA. Under a traditional structure, a lender might require a 3.0x leverage covenant. Under a covenant-lite structure, the lender allows the company to reach 7.0x leverage without a technical default, provided the company does not issue new debt. If the company's cash flow drops, the lender cannot force a meeting to discuss the debt until a payment is missed. The lender must decide if the 8% PIK interest component (common in public BDCs) is being used to mask a fundamental decline in the company's ability to generate cash (catenaa.com).
What lenders should do next
Lenders should not retreat from the market, but they must change their monitoring toolkit. If the legal "teeth" of maintenance covenants are gone, the "eyes" of the lender must be sharper. We recommend the following actions for credit teams:
- Focus on Cash Flow, not Accrual: Prioritize the analysis of actual cash flow over EBITDA, especially in sectors with high software exposure where revenue recognition and capitalization policies can vary (catenaa.com).
- Monitor "Shadow" Covenants: Even if they are not in the credit agreement, lenders should maintain internal "shadow" models that track the borrower's performance against traditional ratios. This allows for an early warning signal, even if it does not provide a legal right to intervene.
- Assess PIK Trends: Monitor the percentage of interest being paid via PIK. A rising trend in PIK interest is a primary indicator of deteriorating cash flow and increasing leverage (gfmag.com).
- Verify Collateral Value: Conduct more frequent, unannounced audits of collateral, particularly in industries with rapidly depreciating assets or complex intellectual property.
Borrowers, conversely, should prepare for a more intrusive monitoring environment. While you may not have to report a covenant breach, lenders will be looking at your cash movements and liquidity positions with much higher scrutiny. Transparency in your cash flow forecasting is your best tool for maintaining a relationship with a lender in a covenant-lite environment.